Beginning in early September 2025, the Trump administration launched a series of lethal strikes in international waters of the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean targeting vessels the U.S. claims are involved in narcotics trafficking.[1] The first publicly acknowledged strike on September 2nd reportedly killed 11 people and targeted a speedboat near Venezuela, said to be operated by the criminal group Tren de Aragua.[2] Over the following months, the strikes escalated: October saw the first operations in the Pacific, and by early November the count included at least 16 recorded strikes, with U.S. officials reporting more than 70 individuals killed so far.[3] These strikes constitute unlawful uses of force under international law, violating core principles of the UN Charter, the law of the sea, and customary norms governing state economic and military conduct.[4]
The U.S. has framed these operations as part of an “armed conflict” against drug-trafficking organizations, designating many as “terrorist organizations” and labeling those aboard the struck vessels as “narco-terrorists.”[5] But the strikes have triggered significant legal, diplomatic, and international human rights concerns.[6] The Trump administration has not publicly provided evidence that the vessels were carrying narcotics or that their occupants posed a direct armed threat to the United States, making the strikes appear as extrajudicial killings.[7] The build-up of U.S. naval forces in the region and the targeting of vessels linked to or near Venezuela have been interpreted by some regional leaders as a form of coercive pressure on the Venezuelan government.[8] The U.S. strikes on Venezuelan boats represent a dangerous escalation of unilateral force that undermines international law and sets a troubling precedent.[9] Cloaked in the language of counter-narcotics and national security, these actions sidestep both UN authority and Congressional oversight.[10] The U.S. continues a long-standing pattern of coercive intervention that prioritizes control over human rights and sovereignty.[11]
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,” except when authorized by the UN Security Council or exercised in self-defense under Article 51.[12] This also includes using force against a state to destabilize or otherwise.[13] The recent U.S. strikes against Venezuelan boats in international and regional waters violate this fundamental principle because they constitute unilateral uses of force absent any legitimate Security Council authorization or imminent armed attack from Venezuela.[14] By targeting vessels allegedly engaged in drug trafficking and labeling them as “narco-terrorists,” the U.S. has blurred the distinction between law enforcement and armed conflict, extending military jurisdiction into a domain that should fall under international criminal and maritime law.[15] According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), an “armed conflict” requires protracted violence between organized armed groups or between a state and such groups.[16] These thresholds are not met here, as these targeted strikes against non-state criminal actors do not fit the criteria for an armed group that warrants military action, as there has been no proof that these fishing vessels were armed or even carried narcotics in the first place.[17]
These attacks also contravene the law of the sea under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which limits enforcement against foreign vessels to clearly defined circumstances and undermines the principle of state sovereignty by carrying out extraterritorial military actions without consent.[18] Article 301 of UNCLOS emphasized that states “shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”[19] Moreover, the strikes violate customary international law norms requiring necessity, proportionality, and transparency in the use of force.[20] These standards are not satisfied when operations are justified mainly by political motives or drug-control efforts, rather than by an immediate threat to U.S. security.[21] These international law principles are being blatantly violated by the Trump administration, especially considering that it has not provided sufficient evidence that all the vessels attacked were carrying narcotics. [22] While the United States may attempt to justify these strikes as acts of anticipatory self-defense or as contributions to a broader theory of “collective security,” these arguments fail because there is no evidence of an imminent armed threat nor any Security Council authorization permitting such unilateral uses of force.[23]
To contextualize the current U.S. use of force, it is important to trace how the “narco-state narrative through economic sanctions evolved into a broader justification for coercive measures, including unilateral strikes. This demarcation of Venezuela as a “narco-state” is not new under the Trump administration.[24] U.S. sanctions against Venezuela since the 2000s have functioned as a form of economic warfare designed to delegitimize the Venezuelan government by portraying it as a corrupt “narco-state.”[25] This rhetoric intensified under the Obama and Trump administrations, and the U.S. used sanctions to isolate Venezuela financially, targeting its officials, banks, and state-owned oil company, which were designed to destabilize the country.[26] The 2015 designation of Venezuela as an “extraordinary threat to U.S. national security” laid the legal groundwork for escalating sanctions, culminating in Trump’s near-total embargo and the 2020 U.S. Department of Justice indictment of President Nicolás Maduro and other top officials for “narco-terrorism.”[27] These million-dollar bounties for their arrests were inconsistent with U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration data showing that most cocaine trafficking routes bypass Venezuela entirely.[28] These accusations serve less to address drug trafficking than to justify regime change under the guise of fighting crime and corruption.[29]
The U.S. effort to label Venezuela a narco-state was part of a larger narrative strategy to legitimize economic warfare, and now armed conflict, to discredit anti-imperialist governments in Latin America.[30] The sanctions are part of a broader U.S. effort to dismantle the “Pink Tide” of leftist governments that pursued independent, redistributive policies and to deter other nations from challenging neoliberal norms.[31] The “narco-terrorism” label thus became a political weapon intended to delegitimize the Venezuelan state internationally and justify measures that crippled its oil-dependent economy.[32] The result has been catastrophic for Venezuelan society: the collapse of oil revenues, food and medicine shortages, mass migration, among others.[33] These sanctions and recent attacks constitute economic and military coercion, which contravenes many mechanisms of international law.[34] For example, the UN General Assembly Resolution 78/135 condemns the use of economic coercion as an international macroaggression, declaring that “such measures constitute a flagrant violation of the principles of international law as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the basic principles of the multilateral trading system.”[35] Furthermore, the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations declares in its article 3(2) that “no State may use or encourage the use of economic political or any other type of measures to coerce another State to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.”[36] These attacks on Venezuelan fishing vessels only intensify the human rights crises occurring in the country and serve as a destabilization tactic to serve the U.S.’s global narrative against the Venezuelan regime.[37]
These sanctions and the narco-state narrative violate international law and amount to collective punishment.[38] They are not driven by genuine concerns about narcotics or human rights but by geopolitical motives to weaken any government resisting U.S. economic and political dominance.[39] By labeling Venezuela a narco-state, the U.S. reframed economic strangulation as moral intervention, masking what he calls an illegal campaign of coercion aimed at destabilizing the Maduro regime at the expense of the lives of Venezuelan citizens.[40] Ultimately, these actions constitute unlawful uses of economic and military force under international law, violating the UN Charter, the law of the sea, and customary norms designed to constrain state coercion.[41] Strengthening compliance will require concrete reforms, including concrete UN-led investigations into these strikes, greater international demand for transparency in U.S. counter-narcotics operations, and the reestablishment of clear legal thresholds distinguishing law enforcement from armed conflict.[42] Adhering to these principles is essential not only to uphold international law but to prevent the normalization of unilateral coercive intervention.
[1] US Strikes Another Alleged Drug Boat Bringing Death Toll from Campaign in Latin America to 70, Guardian (Nov. 7, 2025), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/nov/07/us-strikes-another-alleged-drug-boat-latin-america (last visited Nov. 17, 2025).
[2] Idrees Ali, Phil Stewart, Jeff Mason & Daphne Psaledakis, “Pentagon Chief Suggests More Operations Against Cartels Coming,” Reuters (Sept. 3, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-administration-says-more-operations-against-cartels-coming-2025-09-03/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2025).
[3] “US Strikes Another Alleged Drug Boat,” supra note 1.
[4] Jacob Crosse, “UN accuses US of violating human rights laws in Caribbean and Pacific airstrikes,” World Socialist Web Site (Oct. 31, 2025), https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2025/11/01/gwgz-n01.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2025).
[5] Ali et al., supra, note 2.
[6] Id.
[7] Jasper Ward, UN experts say U.S. strikes against Venezuela in international waters amount to extrajudicial killings, Reuters (Oct. 21, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/un-experts-say-us-strikes-against-venezuela-international-waters-amount-2025-10-21/.
[8] “UN Experts Condemn Coercive Intervention in Venezuela by the United States,” OHCHR (Oct. 21, 2025), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/10/un-experts-condemn-coercive-intervention-venezuela-united-states (last visited Nov. 17, 2025).
[9] Id.
[10] Patricia Zengerle, “US Senators Want Answers on ‘Anti-Drug’ Strategy as Venezuela Tensions Rise,” Reuters (Oct. 31, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-senators-want-answers-anti-drug-strategy-venezuela-tensions-rise-2025-10-31/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2025).
[11] Crosse, supra, note 4.
[12] Charter of the United Nations art. 2, ¶ 4, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI.
[13] Id.
[14] Matt Murphy & Joshua Cheetham, US Strike on ‘Venezuela Drug Boat’: What Do We Know, and Was It Legal?, BBC News (Sept. 3, 2025), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdjzw3gplv7o (last visited Nov. 19, 2025).
[15] Id.
[16] International Armed Conflict, ICRC Casebook: How Does Law Protect in War?, (last visited Nov. 19, 2025), https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/international-armed-conflict.
[17] Id.
[18] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
[19] UNCLOS, art. 301.
[20] Ward, supra, note 7.
[21] Id.
[22] Ali et al., supra, note 2.
[23] Id.
[24] Gregory Wilpert, Sanctions as War, in The U.S. War on Venezuela, in Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy, Studies in Critical Social Sciences, vol. 212 (Brill 2021).
[25] Id. at 277.
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] Id. at 276
[29] Id.
[30] Wilpert, supra, at 277.
[31] Id. at 273.
[32] Id. at 277.
[33] Id. at 278.
[34] Id.
[35] G.A. Res. 78/135, U.N. Doc. A/78/135 (2023).
[36] G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625, at art. 3(2) (Oct. 24, 1970).
[37] Ward, supra note 7.
[38] Id.
[39] Wilpert, supra note 24, at 277.
[40] Id.
[41]UN Experts Condemn Coercive Intervention, supra, note 8.
[42] Id.