The Seizure of the Marinera: A Dangerous Precedent

https://www.dhs.gov/medialibrary/collections/6187
https://www.dhs.gov/medialibrary/collections/6187

On January 7, 2026, the Trump administration seized the Marinera, a ship transporting sanctioned Venezuelan oil[1]. This seizure violated longstanding international law regarding naval warfare and seizures of merchant vessels, as laid out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCOS) and the Law of Naval Warfare. The fact that the Trump adminsitration went ahead with it anyway calls into question the administration’s future cooperation with international law.

Broadly speaking, international law regarding naval warfare and conduct at sea depends on what country a ship is registered to and what type of ship it is. The Marinera was a merchant vessel, and had changed its name and registration numerous times[2]. It was registered under Russia in late December 2025, and this was accompanied by diplomatic notes from Russia to the United States urging it to cease the pursuit of the vessel[3].

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was passed in 1982[4]. The United States has not ratified it, yet still recognizes it as a customary part of international law and practice[5]. UNCLOS Article 110 lays out the Right of Visit, which forbids warships to board other ships they encounter upon the high seas unless, among other exceptions, they suspect a ship of being without nationality[6]. “Nationality” refers to the ship’s registration with a nation, a so-called ‘flag state.’[7] Under Article 91, so long as there is a ‘genuine link’ between the flag state and the ship, states may register ships in their name however they wish.[8]

Under UNCLOS, the legality of the seizure of the Marinera was dependent upon whether it was nationless. If it was not nationless, American warships had no right to seize it. Taking the effective Russian registration as true, the main question is whether the Marinera possessed a ‘genuine link’ to Russia. That term is not defined in UNCLOS, and there is no broad consensus on its definition. However, it has generally been held that registration alone is insufficient. The fact that Russia asked the U.S. to cease pursuing the Marinera indicates a vested interest in its activities, and that, combined with the registration, makes the presence of some sort of genuine link likely.

Further international law governing the seizure of the Marinera comes from the Law of Naval Warfare, a body of customary law providing guidelines for military operations at sea.[9] While these laws are merely persuasive, they have been recognized by the United States and many other countries. The United States has two main sources laying out this customary law as it interprets it; The Newport Manual on the Law of Naval Warfare (The Newport Manual) and the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (The San Remo Manual).[10] As they overlap considerably, only the Newport manual will be covered.

According to the Newport Manual, the laws of naval warfare only apply given the existence of an “International Armed Conflict” (IAC), which it claims exists, “whenever there is a resort to armed force between states”.[11] Only warships and military aircraft may exercise “belligerent rights” during an IAC, which include, “the right to visit, search, and diversion of enemy and neutral vessels.”[12] It holds that merchant ships are neutral vessels, but may be converted to warships for a side in an IAC if certain conditions are met[13].

The Newport manual also allows for the capture of merchant vessels under prize law. The Newport Manual allows for the capture of enemy merchant vessels as a right, and the capture of neutral merchant vessels for cause.[14] Merchant vessels are considered ‘enemy’ if they fly an enemy state flag or bear its markings. ‘Cause’ is conveyed if a neutral merchant vessel is, “[a]cting on behalf of the enemy or operating directly under enemy control, orders, charter, employment, or direction; [o]n a voyage especially undertaken with a view to transport individual passengers who are embodied within the armed forces of the enemy, carrying contraband, presenting irregular or fraudulent documents, lacking necessary documents, or destroying, defacing, or concealing documents, breaching or attempting to breach a blockade, violating regulations established by a belligerent in the immediate area of naval operations, [or] communicating information in the interest of the enemy.”[15]

According to publicly available information, the Marinera was not subject to capture under any of the criteria given by the Newport Manual[16]. It was registered to Russia, with which the United States was not in an IAC at the time. The only legitimate justification for the seizure comes from the possibility that the Marinera was carrying fraudulent documentation, justifying a taking of it as prize. However, there is no publicly available information to support this claim. Even if there was a valid reason for the U.S. to take it as a prize, the Newport Manual holds that ships taken as such must be processed in a domestic prize court, which the U.S. has not done with the Marinera.[17]

Under existing international law, there is no valid legal basis for the U.S. seizure of the Marinera. Under UNCLOS, it is almost certainly not stateless, and so U.S. vessels had no right to seize it. Under the Newport Manual, it could not have made itself an enemy vessel, as it was registered to a nation the U.S. was not in conflict with. There is a narrow route for justifying its taking as a prize, yet the U.S. has not followed the legal procedures for handling ships taken as such. The administration’s failure to follow proper procedure for taking the Marinera as prize indicates a serious neglect of international law. While the trade of sanctioned oil is certainly a problem, unilateral use of military force and flagrant disregard for international law are just as, if not more so, problematic.


[1] Rob McLaughlin, Conor McLaughlin and Michael Schmitt, The Law of Naval warfare and the U.S. Capture of Neutral Merchant Vessels: The Case of the Marinera, Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/129792/lonw-capture-vessels-case-marinera/ (Jan. 29, 2026).

[2] Id.

[3] Stephanie Connor, When economic warfare meets gunboat diplomacy: What to know about the US seizures of shadow fleet tankers, Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/when-economic-warfare-meets-gunboat-diplomacy-what-to-know-about-the-us-seizures-of-shadow-fleet-tankers/ (Feb. 5, 2026).

[4] U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

[5] Tommy Koh, The United States and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 3 U.S.-Asia Law Institute (2022).

[6] U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 4, at art. 110.

[7] Id.

[8] Id. at art.91.

[9] Rob McLaughlin and Conor McLaughlin, A Law of the Sea Assessment of the U.S. boarding of the Bella 1/Marinera, Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/128760/law-sea-assessment-boarding-bella1-marinera/ (Jan. 14, 2026).

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Newport Manual on the Law of Naval Warfare, International Law Studies, 2023, at 1, 2.

[13] Id. at 39.

[14] Id. at 54, 58.

[15] Id. at 167.

[16] McLaughlin, supra note 9.

[17] Id.