Introduction
Last summer, the United Kingdom amended the Terrorism Act 2000 to proscribe Palestine Action, a group that seeks to disrupt and oppose Israel’s genocide[1] in Gaza through direct action, as a terrorist organization.[2] By amending the law, the U.K. made it a criminal offense to “[express] an opinion or belief that is supportive” of Palestine Action, to be a member of Palestine Action, and even to “wear an item of clothing that would arouse ‘reasonable suspicion’ that a person is a member of or supports the organization.”[3] Consequently, British police started arresting en masse individuals who expressed support for Palestine Action, many of whom did so by silently holding up signs.[4] The sweep of the law has been extraordinarily broad; out of about 1,500 people that attended a pro-Palestine protest in London on September 12, 2025, almost 900 were arrested for expressing support for Palestine Action.[5] In February 2026, however, the High Court of Justice found that the proscription of Palestine Action was unlawful, and British police stated they would no longer enforce the ban.[6]
Domestically, the High Court of Justice’s decision represents a win for free expression rights in the U.K. However, the Court’s determination was made on the basis of British law; it did not consider the existing international legal framework that compels states to protect civil and political rights outside of British law.[7] Contemplating that framework, the conclusion is the same. As this article will argue, the United Kingdom is undoubtedly in violation of international law by treating Palestine Action as a terrorist organization and arresting those who express support for it.
I. Freedom of Speech and Expression as a Right Protected by International Law
The modern codification of universal human rights stems from the aftermath of World War 2 and the Nuremberg Trials.[8] Following the prosecution of Nazi leaders for crimes against humanity, the United Nations (UN) was established on the basis that “all signatory governments would promote ‘universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.’”[9] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted three years after the establishment of the UN, articulated broad, universal rights that went beyond rights that merely supported “minimum conditions for human life.”[10] Among those rights, codified in Article 19 of the UDHR, is the “freedom of . . . expression,” which includes the right to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”[11] Freedom of expression was not considered a mere secondary right; to the contrary, it had previously been held by the UN that freedom of expression was a “fundamental human right and the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.”[12] Freedom of expression, therefore, was integral to the protection and proliferation of other fundamental human rights contemplated by the UDHR.
The UDHR, however, does not function as a traditional compact or agreement. It does not order or attempt to compel states to act consistently with its provisions.[13] It is purely aspirational—it simply calls for nations to “[keep] this Declaration constantly in mind” and to “strive . . . to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance.”[14] For these guarantees to mean anything, the UN required an actual enforcement mechanism—some “teeth” that could proactively protect the right to free expression.[15] That function would be served by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
The ICCPR was adopted in 1966 and became effective in 1976, and it serves to protect people’s substantive rights against state infringement.[16] Particularly relevant here, Article 19 of the ICCPR protects people’s freedom of expression, including “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”[17] Notably, the ICCPR states that the right to express oneself freely is not unqualified; the ICCPR permits restrictions to free expression if they are “provided by law and are necessary (a) [f]or respect of the rights or reputations of others; [and] (b) [f]or the protection of national security or of public order, . . . or of public health or morals.”[18] Unlike the UDHR, the ICCPR is binding on signatory states, compelling them to “ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.”[19] One of those signatory states is the United Kingdom.[20]
The United Kingdom’s obligations to protect the free expression rights of its citizens are clear: under the ICCPR, the U.K. must not infringe upon people’s rights to express views and to receive information and ideas unless it can demonstrate that such an infringement is necessary to protect the rights of others or to protect national security or public order. A basic examination shows that the United Kingdom’s proscription of Palestine Action and criminalization of expression in support of it cannot meet the standard the ICCPR demands.
II. The United Kingdom’s Violation of International Law’s Speech and Expression Protections
A. The Terrorism Act 2000
The Terrorism Act 2000 provides the United Kingdom with legal methods by which organizations can be defined as terrorist organizations, which consequently permits the State to criminalize membership in and expression of support for those organizations.[21] Terrorism under the Act is defined as “the use or threat of action” that involves serious violence and property damage that is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public in order to advance an ideological cause.[22] If an organization is “concerned in terrorism” as defined by the statute, the Secretary of State may proscribe that organization by listing it in Schedule II of the Act.[23] Under this standard, over eighty organizations have been deemed terrorist organizations and listed under Schedule II; notable organizations include Al-Qaeda, the Irish Republican Army, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and Hamas.[24]
Proscription inflicts heavy consequences on organization members and supporters. The Act criminalizes membership in proscribed organizations by imprisonment for up to fourteen years,[25] and, critically, the Act criminalizes “support” for proscribed organizations by imprisonment for up to fourteen years.[26] “Support” for proscribed organizations includes “express[ing] an opinion or belief that is supportive of a proscribed organi[z]ation,” arranging or managing a meeting that supports a proscribed organization.[27]
Because of Palestine Action’s proscription,[28] the U.K. made it a criminal offense to simply peacefully express support for Palestine Action.[29] This does immense damage to people’s freedom of expression, which the U.K. has an obligation to protect under the ICCPR. The only way the United Kingdom could justify the Act’s breadth would be if it could show that the criminalization of supportive expression was necessary either for the protection the rights of others or to protect national security or public order.
B. The United Kingdom’s Actions Do Not Meet the Standard of the ICCPR
The United Kingdom could not show that the Act’s criminalization of expression supporting Palestine Action was necessary to protect people’s rights or to protect national security or public order. Necessity is a high threshold under the ICCPR; restrictions on expression cannot be “overbroad, . . . they must be appropriate to achieve their protective function[,] [and] they must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve their protective function.”[30] The breadth of the Act demonstrates that the criminalization of expressing support for Palestine Action is “overbroad” and not the “least intrusive instrument” to achieve the Act’s goals.
Firstly, the Act’s suppression of expression is not necessary to protect or respect others’ rights. While the Act’s enhancement of State power to combat terrorism can be viewed as protecting the lives and safety of people in the United Kingdom (recognized as human rights under the UDHR),[31] the Act’s criminalization of expressing support for Palestine Action is not the least intrusive means to carry out the Act’s mission. The majority of protesters supporting Palestine Action are peaceful, presenting no threat to the life or security of others. Of 857 people arrested at the London pro-Palestine protest on September 12, seventeen people, or less than 2% of the arrested protesters, were alleged to engage in any kind of violence in the form of assaulting police officers.[32] There are means less restrictive than arresting peaceful protesters for mere expression available to serve the Act’s interests in protecting life and safety. For example, the Act could instead focus on actions, as opposed to expression, that support terrorist organizations, which is more likely to have tangible impacts on life and safety. Because this alternative exists, the Act’s scope is overbroad, and thus not necessary to protect and respect people’s rights.
The Act’s abridgment of expression is also not necessary to protect national security or public order for similar reasons. Protesters, such as those at the September 12 protest, largely act peacefully and often protest silently; many protesters on September 12 were even seated.[33] Silent, peaceful protest cannot reasonably be construed as damaging to public order or national security in the same way that violent protests or riots can. The Act does not distinguish between socially disruptive protests and stationary, silent, peaceful protests; the Act instead contemplates and criminalizes the viewpoint and subject matter of the expression underlying the protest, which makes the Act not limited in scope, and thus overbroad.
Conclusion
General Comment Number 34 to the ICCPR says:
[s]tates [sic] parties should ensure that counter-terrorism measures are compatible with paragraph 3. Such offences as ‘encouragement of terrorism’ and ‘extremist activity’ as well as offences of ‘praising,’ ‘glorifying,’ or ‘justifying’ terrorism, should be clearly defined to ensure that they do not lead to unnecessary or disproportionate interference with freedom of expression.[34]
The United Kingdom, in proscribing Palestine Action under the Terrorism Act 2000, has failed to do so. By arresting peaceful protesters simply for expressing support for Palestine Action, the U.K. has failed to perform its obligation to protect the freedom of expression afforded all people by the ICCPR, and therefore is in violation of international law.
[1] See International Association of Genocide Scholars [IAGS], IAGS Resolution on the Situation in Gaza, at 3 (Aug. 31, 2025), https://genocidescholars.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/IAGS-Resolution-on-Gaza-FINAL.pdf; See also Emir Nader, Israel Committing Genocide in Gaza, World’s Leading Experts say, BBC (Sep. 1, 2025), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cde3eyzdr63o (“A resolution passed by the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) states that Israel’s conduct meets the legal definition as laid out in the UN convention on genocide.”).
[2] Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, sch. 2; Michael Sheils McNamee, MPs Approve Plan to Proscribe Palestine Action as Terrorist Group, BBC (July 2, 2025), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2d0j0ljdzko; Freddie Clayton, Why is the U.K. Arresting Peaceful Protesters on Terrorism Charges?, NBC (Sep. 12, 2025), https://www.nbcnews.com/world/united-kingdom/uk-arresting-peaceful-protesters-terrorism-charges-rcna229618. See also Lizzie Dearden & Stephen Castle, In Blow to Starmer, U.K. Ban on Pro-Palestinian Group Is Ruled Unlawful, N. Y. Times (Feb. 13, 2026), https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/13/world/europe/uk-palestine-action-ban-court-ruling.html (describing some of the direct action taken by Palestine Action members).
[3] Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, §§ 11, 12, 13; UK: Palestine Action Ban ‘Disturbing’ Misuse of UK Counter-terrorism Legislation, Türk warns, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (July 25, 2025), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/07/uk-palestine-action-ban-disturbing-misuse-uk-counter-terrorism-legislation.
[4] Clayton, supra note 2.
[5] Id.
[6] Dearden & Castle, supra note 2. See R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 292 (appeal taken from Eng.).
[7] The Court’s determination was that the proscription was “disproportionate” and constituted “significant interference” with free expression rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, incorporated into British law by the Human Rights Act 1998. R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 292 (appeal taken from Eng.); Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 § 1 (“the Convention” referring to the European Convention on Human Rights as stated in the statute’s introduction).
[8] See Joy Gordon, The Concept of Human Rights: the History and Meaning of its Politicization, 23 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 689, 702–04 (1998).
[9] Id. at 704.
[10] Id.; see generally G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
[11] UDHR, supra note 10, at 74–75.
[12] G.A. Res. 59 (I), at 95 (Dec. 14, 1946).
[13] Gordon, supra note 8, at 705.
[14] UDHR, supra note 10, at 72.
[15] See Gordon, supra note 8, at 710.
[16] Gordon, supra note 8, at 707; see generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
[17] ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 19.
[18] Id.
[19] ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 3; see also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sep. 12, 2011) [hereinafter General Comment No. 34] (“[t]he obligation to respect freedoms of opinion and expression is binding on every State party as a whole”).
[20] See Ratification Status for CCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Treaty Body Database, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?Treaty=CCPR&Lang=en (last visited Mar. 20, 2026).
[21] See generally Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11.
[22] Id. § 1
[23] Id. § 3.
[24] Id. sch. 2.
[25] Id. § 11.
[26] Id. § 12.
[27] Id. §§ 12(1A), (2).
[28] See infra Introduction.
[29] Id.
[30] General Comment No. 34, supra note 19, ¶ 34.
[31] See UDHR, supra note 10, at 72.
[32] Clayton, supra note 2.
[33] Clayton, supra note 2.
[34] General Comment No. 34, supra note 19, ¶ 46